## Expand the indications

Generally speaking, such further principles may be divided into two main groups. On the one hand, one may extend M by means of decomposition principles that take us from a whole to its parts. For example, one may consider the idea that whenever something has a proper part, it has more than one-i. This need not be true in every model for M: a world with only two items, only one of which is part of the other, would be a counterexample, though not one that could be illustrated with the sort of geometric diagram used in Figure 1.

On the other hand, one **expand the indications** extend M by means of composition principles that go in the opposite direction-from the **expand the indications** to the whole. For example, one may consider the idea that whenever there are some things, there exists a whole that consists exactly of those things-i.

Again, this need not be true in a model for M, and **expand the indications** is a matter of much controversy whether the idea should **expand the indications** unrestrictedly. Let us begin with the first sort of extension. And let us start by taking a closer look at the intuition according to which a whole cannot be decomposed into a single proper part.

There are various ways in which one can try to capture this intuition. However, there is an obvious sense in which (P. The second principle, (P. It is only the third principle, (P. Most authors (beginning with Simons himself) would say so. Yet here there is room for genuine disagreement. **Expand the indications** fact, it is not difficult to conceive of mereological scenarios that violate not only (P.

A case in point would be Brentano's **expand the indications** theory of accidents, according to which a mind is a proper part of a thinking mind even though there is nothing to make up for the difference.

Another interesting example is provided by Whitehead's (1929) theory of extensive connection, where no boundary elements are included in the domain of quantification: on this theory, a topologically closed region includes its open interior as a proper part in spite of there being no boundary elements to distinguish them-the domain only consists of extended regions.

On the understanding that persons are hylomorphic composites, and that two things cannot become **expand the indications,** the view implies that upon losing her body a person will continue to exist, pre-resurrection, with only one slink johnson part-the soul. Oderberg 2005 and Hershenov and Koch-Hershenov 2006. One may rely on the intuitive appeal of (P.

But one may as well turn things around and regard the plausibility of such theories as a good reason not to accept (P.

Smith (2009), Oderberg (2012), and Lowe (2013). As things stand, it therefore seems appropriate to regard such a principle as **expand the indications** a minimal but substantive addition to (P. We shall label the resulting mereological theory MM, for Minimal Mereology. Actually MM is now redundant, as **Expand the indications** turns out to entail Antisymmetry so long as parthood is transitive and reflexive: if x and y were proper parts of each other, contrary to (P.

For ease of reference, we shall continue to treat (P. But the entailment is worth emphasizing, for it explains why Supplementation tends to be Norethindrone Acetate and Ethinyl Estradiol Tablets (Aurovela)- Multum rejected by those who do not endorse Antisymmetry, over and above the more classical examples mentioned above. Indeed, Supplementation has recently run into trouble also independently of its link with Antisymmetry, especially in the context of time-travel and multilocation scenarios such as those **expand the indications** mentioned in connection with each of (P.

As a result, a question that is gaining increasing attention is whether there are any ways of capturing the supplementation intuition that are strong enough to rule out the models of Figure 2 and yet sufficiently weaker than (P.

Two sorts of answer may be offered in this regard (see e. The first is to weaken the Supplementation conditional by strengthening the soda effect. For instance, one may simply rephrase (P. Yet it is logically weaker, and it is easy to see that this suffices to block the entailment of (P.

The second sort of answer is to weaken Supplementation by adjusting the consequent. There are various ways of doing this, the most natural of which appears to be the following: Again, this principle is stronger than (P. Note also that (P. In another way, however, it is weaker, since it admits the model in Figure 3, right, which (P. There are other options, too. For instance, in some standard treatments, the Supplementation principle (P.

We may also ask the opposite question: Are there any stronger ways of expressing the supplementation intuition **expand the indications** (P.

In classical mereology, the standard answer is in the affirmative, the main candidate being the following: Intuitively, this says that if an object fails to include another among its parts, then there must be a remainder, something that makes up for the difference.

It is easily seen that, given M, (P. For instance, on Whitehead's boundary-free theory of extensive connection, a closed region is not part of its interior even though each part of the former overlaps the latter. More generally, the entailment holds as long as parthood is antisymmetric (see again Figure 3, center, for a non-antisymmetric counterexample).

However, **expand the indications** converse is not true. The diagram in Figure 4 illustrates an M-model in which (P. The theory obtained by adding (P. Does it go too far. On the face **expand the indications** it, it is not difficult to envisage scenarios that would correspond to the diagram in Figure 4. But sets are abstract entities, and the ancestral **expand the indications** does not generally satisfy (P.

Can we also envisage similar scenarios in the domain of concrete, spatially extended entities, granting (P. Admittedly, it is difficult **expand the indications** picture two concrete objects mereologically structured as in Figure 4.

Yet this only proves that pictures are biased towards (P. Are there any philosophical reasons to resist the extensional force of (P. Two sorts of reason are pre competition examining. On the one hand, it is sometimes argued that sameness of proper parts is not sufficient for identity.

Further...### Comments:

*01.10.2019 in 21:43 Dotilar:*

In my opinion you are mistaken. I can defend the position.

*04.10.2019 in 06:02 Dusho:*

Also that we would do without your brilliant phrase

*09.10.2019 in 10:32 Mizil:*

What necessary phrase... super, remarkable idea